I am not talking about an advanced theory about how people believe things. I`m just going to oppose it between believing and being a little incredulous. Confusion is not the word “faith” but the word “disbelief.” Some consider “disbelief” as a simple lack of faith in something. Others take “increduation” as a belief in the denial of something. It is this latter meaning that is generally understood in the philosophical context. If we go according to the normal sense of `faith` and the second meaning of `disbelief`, then we should be able to see that this is a false dichotomy; We don`t believe in anything or disbelief. There is a third option, namely that one does not believe in the thing at all.1 Here is a table that shows trichotomy, as well as a symbolic representation of the logic of options: indeed, an over-reliance on emotionally charged language can create the appearance of divergences between parties that do not differ at all in fact, and it can just as easily mask substantive quarrels under a veneer of emotional convergence. Since the degrees of concordance in faith and attitude are independent of each other, there are four possible combinations at work here: I suggest that for reasons of clarity, that one should use “I believe something” to say the first row, “I have no opinion on something,” to tell me the second row, and “I believe in something” to give me the third row. To make me feel a lack of faith in something, I propose to use the phrase “I don`t have to believe that anything”. Avoid using the phrase “I don`t think anything” because it is ambiguous. Once we understand this, we can move on to the second part of this article.
I propose that we define agreement and disagreement in a similar way to the terms defined above. This means that you agree with someone on something to believe what the other believes. Not arguing with someone about something is believing the denial of what the other believes. Note that the usual use of “disunity” is simply not believing what the other person believes. I suggest that if you mean you don`t believe what the other person believes, you should say, “I don`t agree.” If you accept this redefinition in the context of philosophy, you should see that the dichotomy between agreement and disagreement is false. You may not have an opinion on anything. There is often some confusion around the terms: faith, disbelief, concordance and disagreement when used in a philosophical context. We must bear in mind that definitions of ordinary dictionaries are often insufficiently accurate to be used in a philosophical context where precision and clarity are essential. (For analytical philosophy.) In this article, I will explain the terms “faith” and “increduation,” as well as “agreement” and “disagreement.” Second, I propose a new possibility of defining terms in the name of clarity.